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Abstract
Password managers are a potential solution to the
password conundrum, but adoption is paltry. We inves-
tigated the impact of a recommender application that
harnessed the tenets of self-determination theory to en-
courage adoption of password managers. This theory
argues that meeting a person’s autonomy, relatedness
and competence needs will make them more likely to act.
To test the power of meeting these needs, we conducted a
factorial experiment, in the wild. We satisfied each of the
three self-determination factors, and all individual com-
binations thereof, and observed short-term adoption of
password managers. When all self-determination fac-
tors were satisfied, adoption was highest, while meeting
only the autonomy or relatedness needs individually sig-
nificantly improved the likelihood of adoption.
1. Introduction
The alphanumeric password is still the dominant user
authentication approach. This human propensity to
choose weak passwords has been the thorn in the se-
curity professional’s side ever since computer users first
started using passwords [1]. Researchers have tried to
improve password practice [2, 3, 4], but the problem is
proving intractable. People find the general password
concept burdensome, primarily due to memory load [5],
and they cope by choosing weak passwords or offset
memory load by writing down or reusing them [6].
Password managers solve both security and usabil-
ity problems by removing the need for people to mem-
orize a large number of strong passwords. Many pass-
word manager applications exist, and have been avail-
able since 1999 [7]. They store passwords securely; pro-
tected by a strong master key. This allows users to amor-
tize the effort they expend memorising a strong master
key, because it does not have to be changed. Password
managers effectively shoulder the password burden on
the user’s behalf, and make it easy for them to deploy
strong passwords across all their accounts, because the
primary driver behind password reuse is eliminated.
Despite the obvious benefits, these tools have not
been widely adopted [8]. Low adoption also mani-
fests for other usable security tools, such as fingerprint-
enabled unlocking on Smartphones [9]. If we are able
to find a mechanism for encouraging password manager
adoption, it might be possible to use the same mecha-
nism to encourage the adoption of other security tools
too.
Researchers are turning to behavioral change the-
ories to determine how to exert influence to persuade
people to behave in a particular way [10]. In this pa-
per, we report on an investigation into the impact of a
password manager recommender system that satisfied
the three core tenets of Self-Determination Theory: au-
tonomy, relatedness and competence [11]. Our purpose
was to determine whether meeting these needs, either all
or in different combinations, would improve password
manager uptake.
Prior work is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 out-
lines the hypotheses and Section 4 presents the study
design. The analysis is detailed in Section 5. Our main
findings and limitations are presented in Section 6 and
Section 7 concludes.
2. Related & Background Research
Password Managers: Alphanumeric passwords have
great potential for strength but fail in the hands of a het-
erogeneous users from all walks of life, because people
choose weak passwords. Some solutions attempt to en-
courage stronger password choice [12]. Others suggest
alternatives such as graphical passwords [13] or bio-
metrics [14]. However, such alternatives require major
changes to existing systems and are also personally risky
for developers because they are not the de facto authen-
tication standard.
Password managers avoid password-related effort
[15]. Commercially-available password managers can
be classified into three types: (a) built into the web
browser (e.g. Google Chrome), (b) stand-alone or ded-
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icated (e.g. LastPass) and (c) browser extensions (e.g.
LastPass and Dashlane). Most stand-alone password
managers are also available as browser extensions (e.g.
LastPass).
Password managers store their passwords in three
different ways: (1) locally (e.g. Keepass), (2)
cloud/web-based, (e.g. LastPass), and (3) no-storage or
hashing (e.g. PwdHash).
Password managers re-establish a reasonable bal-
ance between the security and usability of passwords,
enjoying research attention [16, 17, 18, 19]. Most of the
existing research on password managers has focused on
(1) technical aspects of these tools and mechanisms to
improve their security and usability [16, 17], (2) evalu-
ating their security [18, 19], or (3) designing for usabil-
ity [20]. Less work has been carried out on password
manager adoption.
One of the few first studies considering the users’
perspective in using a password manager was published
in 2006 by Chiasson et al. [21]. They conducted a us-
ability study of two desktop password managers: Pwd-
Hash and Password Multiplier. They discovered incor-
rect or incomplete mental models related to password
managers, and also identified usability issues affecting
the participants’ ability to use these tools securely. Ka-
role et al. [22] conducted a usability study compar-
ing three password managers: LastPass (an online pass-
word manager), KeePassMobile (mobile-phone pass-
word manager) and Roboform2Go (portable USB pass-
word manager). Their research showed that although the
online password manager was the easiest to use, users
preferred to use the other two portable password man-
agers. There are clearly a number of password manager-
specific factors at play here, making password manager
adoption different from adoption of other kinds of soft-
ware tools.
Human Motivation: Security is considered a sec-
ondary task by end users [23]. That being so, they try to
avoid engaging with security, especially if it gets in the
way of their primary goal [24]. Blaming users for not us-
ing security measures is not an effective way to enhance
security [5]; system designers need to try to understand
the root causes of these behaviors, and to design security
systems with the user’s needs, capabilities and procliv-
ities in mind [25]. Researchers suggest that non-use is
due to underestimation of the riskiness of insecure be-
haviors [26]. Another explanation is that people have
a “compliance budget” [27] which can be exhausted.
Herley [28] suggests that users make a rational deci-
sion to adopt security measures when the cost-benefit
outcome of adopting these systems outweighs the cost-
benefit outcome of not adopting them. Another perspec-
tive is to consider human motivation. Broadly speak-
ing, human motivation is either: extrinsic or intrinsic
[29]. The former refers to the desire for rewards, such
as money. Intrinsic motivation drives someone to per-
form an activity for the pleasure and satisfaction derived
from engaging in the activity itself. Existing research on
human behavior found the second type to be far more
effective in motivating individuals to act in a particular
way [30]. Accordingly, individuals engage in a range
of behaviors, for which there is no extrinsic motivation,
such as sharing knowledge [31] or donating blood [32].
A myopic focus on extrinsic motivational interventions,
when it comes to encouraging security behaviors, might
well be neglecting far more effective interventions [33].
Researchers in non-security disciplines are already real-
ising this [34].
Human motivations have been studied to explore in-
dividuals’ behavior and mechanisms for encouraging the
adoption of recommended behaviors [35] to help us to
formulate interventions to improve adoption. Motiva-
tion theories such as Self-Determination Theory (SDT)
[11], and Pink’s Motivation Theory [36] can offer a the-
oretical framework for understanding such motivations.
According to SDT theory [11], three basic human
psychological needs affect motivation with respect to an
individual engaging in particular activity. (1) Autonomy
is the desire to have control over one’s own life and the
need to be free to make choices based on personal de-
cisions. (2) Competence refers to the feeling of hav-
ing a sense of self-efficacy in carrying out a particular
task. (3) Relatedness refers to feeling connected to oth-
ers, to feel part of something or belonging to a larger
community. This SDT theory has been applied in dif-
ferent sectors: e.g. education [37] and health care [38].
This theory has also been used to predict users’ intention
to protect information security [39].
The research reported here sought to investigate
the impact of interventions that aimed to satisfy self-
determination needs in order to influence Smartphone
password manager adoption.
Security Behavior Investigations: Some re-
searchers investigate security behavior based on self-
reported data collected with questionnaires [40, 9]. This
method is particularly appropriate in initial studies into
a phenomenon because they are able to elicit responses
from a large population. A questionnaire can be dis-
tributed widely and cheaply. However, the reliability of
self report is debatable, because people are not always
entirely frank in their responses [41].
Another method used for studying information sec-
urity-related behaviors is lab-based experiments [42,
21]. Most such laboratory experiments are solely fo-
cused on exploring particular aspects of a security tool
such as usability for example. [42, 21]. Such studies are
2
Page 4825
essential in making sure that users do not encounter un-
due difficulties using the tool, but because we know that
usability is not the only precursor of adoption, we need
to do more than usability testing.
Another method is to observe actual security behav-
iors [43, 44]. For example, Machuletz et al. [43] applied
the Theory of Reasoned Action to investigate the de-
terminants that lead notebook users to cover their web-
cams and cameras. This method is more reliable than the
others, in terms of uncovering genuine security-related
behaviors. It is indeed challenging to use this method
for all security-related behaviors, because security ac-
tions are solo and sensitive activities. Yet observation
does deliver very valuable insights that are not possible
to obtain as reliably via self report. Since the focus of
this research required us to determine whether the par-
ticipants actually installed a password manager, we used
the observational method.
3. Hypotheses
The goal of this study is to test the effect of satisfying
self-determination theory needs within a password man-
ager recommender application, in terms of observable
short-term adoption of a password manager.
Alkaldi and Renaud [8] report that actual password
manager adoption comprises three stages: (1) search,
(2) decide, and (3) try, the latter being indicative of
short-term adoption. A recommender application will
support users in searching and deciding, and then allow
us to see whether a trial ensues. Long-term adoption is
something that occurs over months and years and cannot
occur without short-term adoption i.e. initial installation
of the password manager. Hence this study is concerned
with determining short-term adoption (i.e. the try stage).
A future study will examine the factors impacting the
long-term adoption.
We formulated the following hypotheses related to
Smartphone password manager adoption.
The first two hypotheses are related to whether the
recommender system makes a difference.
Ha0: There is no difference in password manager
adoption between participants who use a recommender
system, and those who are merely informed of their ex-
istence.
Ha1: The mean number of password manager adop-
tions is greater in the group who use a recommender
system, than in the group who are merely informed of
their existence.
The second set of hypotheses is related to the impact
of self-determination need satisfaction:
Hb0: A recommender application that meets a
participant’s autonomy, competence and relatedness
needs does not change the incidence of password man-
ager adoption.
Hb1: A recommender application that meets au-
tonomy needs significantly increases password manager
adoption.
Hb2: A recommender application that meets com-
petence needs significantly increases password manager
adoption.
Hb3: A recommender application that meets relat-
edness needs significantly increases password manager
adoption.
Hb4: A recommender application that meets com-
petence need significantly increases password manager
adoption only if the autonomy need is also supported.
Hb5: A recommender application that meets relat-
edness need significantly increases password manager
adoption only if the autonomy need is also supported.
Hb6: A recommender application that meets relat-
edness need significantly increases password manager
adoption only if competence need is also supported.
Hb7: A recommender application that meets relat-
edness need significantly increases password manager
adoption only if the competence and autonomy needs
are also supported.
4. Study Design
Over 250 password manager applications are listed in
the Google Play Store. It is challenging for anyone to
evaluate these applications to select the best possible
one. We thus offered people a recommender app that
matched their stated preferences to a subset of the avail-
able password managers. The app essentially eases the
search process.
In order to test the hypotheses, a recommender sys-
tem was developed, called CyberPal, which made it pos-
sible for us to test self determination theory-based inter-
ventions.
Raising Awareness: The recommender’s first role
was to raise awareness of password managers. A pre-
vious study found that people are generally unaware of
password managers [8], so an awareness video was in-
cluded in the intervention. We used the same awareness
video clip that was used by Aurigemma et al.’s study
[45]. This video provides an overview of password man-
agers, and the reason for using them, and details the at-
tractive features of such tools, such as its usefulness and
effectiveness. This video also includes messages calcu-
lated to increase the feeling of certainty with respect to
using a password manager. Having ensured awareness,
we proceeded to support searching and deciding stages.
The CyberPal Recommender Application: Cyber-
Pal was implemented as an Android Smartphone appli-
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cation. The user selects a number of preferred password
manager features. (A number of features of password
managers were identified in a separate study.) The rec-
ommender system then suggested one or more matching
password managers for consideration based on the se-
lected features.
Behavioral Intention: It is reasonable to assume
that intention precedes trial, so it is necessary to mea-
sure participants’ intention. A participant might have a
pre-existing intention to use a password manager, and
he/she then uses the recommender to find the one that
suits him/her best. On the other hand, using CyberPal
might help a person to formulate an intention to use a
password manager. Furthermore, because the experi-
ment was conducted in the wild, we expected that some
participants would have perfectly valid reasons for form-
ing a low, or no, intention to use a password manager.
We thus measure behavioral intention on a 1-7 Likert
scale [46]. We also asked for gender and age. After
a week, a post-questionnaire popped up, asking partic-
ipants to select reasons for choosing to use a password
manager, or not, as the case may be.
Supporting Self Determination Needs: Features
were added to the recommender to support the specific
self determination theory needs dictated by each exper-
imental group. First, the features that can be used to
support each of the three needs were identified from the
literature [47, 48, 49, 50, 51].
Autonomy: The use of non-controlling language
[52, 53], acknowledging negative feelings [54, 53], and
offering more than one options for the person to choose
from [53], but not too many [55] all support autonomy.
CyberPal supports autonomy by: (1) offering choice,
and (2) using non-controlling language. Phrases such as
“would you like..” and “you may...” were used. Fur-
thermore, providing more than one choice engenders a
feeling of autonomy, but too many choices have a po-
tentially negative effect. Three are recommended [56]
(Figure 2).
Relatedness: The relatedness need can be supported
by providing some kind of connectivity related to the tar-
get behavior [57]. It may constitute engendering a sense
of community [58]. During the pre-adoption stage, be-
ing aware of other password manager adopters can sup-
port the relatedness basic need in this context [59]. Be-
cause password managers are critical systems, and rel-
atively poorly known, being aware of the fact that your
contacts are password manager adopters gives the Cy-
berPal user a feeling that they are not alone (Figure 5).
Competence: Suggested strategies for meeting this
need include: (1) offering clarity [60], (2) using posi-
tive feedback [61, 62], (3) providing guidance [60], (4)
encouraging, and (5) supporting their beliefs that they
can perform the target behavior without assistance [63].
A person might like the idea of a password manager,
and want to use one, but be felled by uncertainty, which
could deter them from trialing a password manager.
Figure 1. Main
application
Menu
Figure 2. Meeting Autonomy
Needs
Fig-
ure 3. Placebo
Interface
Figure 4. Meeting
Competence Needs
Figure 5. Meeting Relatedness Needs
CyberPal provides a “frequently-asked questions”
button to reduce uncertainty. A positive feedback mes-
sage is displayed when the user submits their prefer-
ences, to encourage them to proceed to short term adop-
tion. Information about the most desired features chosen
by other CyberPal users is also provided (Figure 4).
Platform: The target population was Android Smart-
phone users. Android was chosen as a platform be-
cause it is used by over 80% of Smartphone users world-
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wide, as compared to other Smartphone operating sys-
tems [64, 65].
Testing: The CyberPal application was tested exten-
sively on 12 Android devices and then tested by a sample
of 6 Android users to improve usability. Finally, the ap-
plication was uploaded to the Betafamily.com test-
ing service, where it was tested by 9 testers over a two
week period. All feedback was used to improve the ap-
plication.
Experiment Design: The experiment allowed us to
test for the following:
(1) The effect of the password manager recom-
mender system compared to only providing information
about a password manager (Hypotheses Ha(0,1)), and
(2) The effect of supporting the three SDT needs, ex-
haustively testing all possible combinations (Hypothe-
ses Hb(0,1-7)).
To avoid the experimental hazard of participants be-
lieving, or expecting, to install password manager, a
placebo effect strategy was used i.e. an intervention that
had no effect. In psychological experiments, researchers
generally utilize a placebo control group: a group of
participants who are exposed to a placebo or fake in-
dependent variable [66, 67, 68]. The impact of this non-
intervention is then compared to the results of the real
independent variable of interest. In the placebo case,
CyberPal merely displayed information about password
manager tools, as derived from the Android Play Store.
Furthermore, to test the impact of each of the three
basic needs, a 2*2*2 factorial experiment design was
used. Eight versions of the recommender system were
deployed, each of which satisfied some combination of
the three SDT needs (Table 1).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the
experimental or the placebo control groups (Table 1).
This type of design can help to establish causation by
determining cause and effect between variables. We can
isolate the impact of each intervention on adoption be-
havior and determine which of the three independent
variables, or their interactions, are more likely to influ-
ence adoption.
Placebo Group: (G1) this group used a version of
CyberPal that was designed to raise awareness of pass-
word manager applications, without the recommender
system. This establishes a baseline of how many people
would adopt password managers merely because they
became aware of them. They were simply shown a list
of password managers from the Google Play Store.
Experimental Groups: (G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7,
G8, G9): The participants used slightly different ver-
sions of the CyberPal recommender application. Each
version supports the different combinations of auton-
omy, competence and relatedness needs.
Table 1. Experimental Group Need Satisfaction
(Autonomy=A, Competence=C, Relatedness=R)
Recommender
App C Not C
A Not A A Not A
R G8 G7 G6 G5
Not R G4 G3 G2 G9
List of password managers (placebo): G1
Ethical Considerations: The data we collected in
the mobile application is privacy sensitive, and we took
great care to respect participants’ privacy. We conducted
the study under University of Glasgow institutional re-
view board approval. The participants’ consent was ob-
tained before collecting any data. We only report aggre-
gate statistics, thereby ensuring participant anonymity.
Tasks: The participants of the CyberPal Android
application were able to carry out the following tasks:
(1) Install CyberPal; (2) Grant consent to participate in
an experiment; (3) Register by their phone number and
choose a user name; (4) Provide the contact number of
the user who invited her/him, if applicable; (5) Com-
plete a pre-questionnaire to provide demographic data
and measure the intention to use a password manager;
(6) Use CyberPal to explore password manager features;
(7) Keep CyberPal on the device for a week; (8) Com-
plete a post-questionnaire.
Recruitment: The CyberPal recommender applica-
tion was launched in the Google Play Store at the end
of June 2017. Any Android user could install the app
and participate in the experiment, if they were happy
to consent to allow the app to collect their data for the
purposes of this research. Also, participants are likely
to have told their friends about CyberPal. This recruit-
ment technique can be used to recruit participants who
are difficult to identify or have to meet certain criteria to
support the study experiment. In our study, we needed
participants who knew each other to support the related-
ness satisfaction conditions in the experiment.
Invitations to participate were also sent to 219,221
Android users, using the Facebook advertising service,
between July and September 2017. The invitation tar-
geted English speakers, aged 18 or over, who owned an
Android device with version 4 or above. To increase the
likelihood of participation, the invitation was sent only
when the device was connected to WiFi. Participants
were enticed by offering them the chance to win one of
five online vouchers of their own choice from one of:
PayPal, Amazon or the Google Play Store.
To encourage participants to recruit other partici-
pants, specifically their friends (to support the related-
ness need), participants were encouraged to invite others
by giving them 10 points for each person who accepted
their invitation to participate in the experiment. The to-
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tal number of collected points for each participant is dis-
played on a scoreboard, accessible from the app’s main
menu.
Later, after the experiment concluded, all partici-
pants who completed their tasks entered the prize draw.
The winner of £50 voucher was selected from the top
10%, then the winner of £30 was selected from the top
30%. Finally, three winners of £10 vouchers were se-
lected from the rest of the participants.
The Google Play Console shows that 762 Android
users installed CyberPal. Only 645 users participated in
the study and these were randomly assigned to one of the
nine groups. After reviewing the received responses, we
eliminated 169 participants who either did not complete
the pre- and/or, post-questionnaires. Moreover, 6 par-
ticipants who completed both questionnaires either did
not use the CyberPal app itself or were already using
a password manager. After discarding these responses,
470 participants were retained to support analysis.
Variables and Measurement Units: In this experi-
ment, the main variables were:
Independent variable: “Intervention application
that supports users’ autonomy, competence and relat-
edness needs, in a variety of combinations”.
Dependent variable: “Install a password manager”.
This was measured by detecting if any password man-
ager was installed on the participant’s device within a
week of using CyberPal. This was detected by regularly
retrieving the names of all the applications on the user’s
device and checking whether a password manager ap-
peared.
Control variable: “Intention to use a password man-
ager”. This was measured using instruments adapted
from [46]. Self-reported responses were recorded on a
7 item Likert scale: seven means high intention to use a
password manager, and 1 indicates low intention.
5. Analysis
62.8% of participants were male, 35.6% female. The
majority were under 45 years of age. Inferential statis-
tical tests were conducted using SPSS version 24 to test
the hypotheses (Section 3).
Table 2 shows that the mean values of intention are
relatively similar across groups; although it is slightly
lower in Group 3. The sample size in each group is
slightly different, an inevitable side effect of random al-
location in the wild. To test the hypotheses, the analysis
comprises two stages.
First, comparison between Group 1 and Group 9 to
test hypotheses Ha(0,1).
Second, comparison between the eight groups to test
hypotheses Hb(0,1-7).
Table 2. Descriptive Analysis (PM=Password
Manager)
Grp SampleSize
Intention
Mean
Installed
PM
Gender
(F/M)
G1 43 4.60 1 (11/32)
G2 53 4.58 19 (14/38)
G3 52 4.14 9 (24/27)
G4 53 4.63 20 (21/31)
G5 51 4.62 18 (15/36)
G6 55 4.62 21 (20/33)
G7 54 4.36 18 (17/37)
G8 57 4.57 24 (22/34)
G9 52 4.57 9 (19/32)
Testing the Impact of the Recommender Appli-
cation: A Crosstabulation test was carried out between
G1 (‘the Placebo Group’) and G9 (‘the group with only
the recommender system’).
The adoption rates were compared (the “installing
password manager” variable). The latter was recorded
as ‘1’ for adoption, and ‘0’ for non-adoption. A χ2 test
was conducted to determine whether there were signif-
icant differences in adoption behavior amongst partici-
pants in the two groups. The χ2 statistic is 5.609. The
the two-sided p-value is .018; which is significant at p
< .05. It suggests that there are significant differences
between the recommender system users, as compared to
the group that merely enhanced awareness. Thus, the
null hypothesis (Ha0) can be rejected. The alternative
hypothesis was tested by comparing the means of pass-
word manager adoption in the two groups. Based on the
result of the Crosstabulation test, the alternative hypoth-
esis is accepted (Ha1).
Testing the Impact of SDT Need Satisfaction: Ta-
ble 3 shows that when the three needs are satisfied (G8),
more participants adopted password managers than par-
ticipants in the other groups. This is followed by the case
when Autonomy and Relatedness needs are met (G6).
We next needed to determine which factors exercised
the greatest influence. First, three variables A, C, and
R that represent the three needs were added to the data
set. The presence of each need was coded as ‘1’ while
the absence was coded as ‘0’. To test the effect of au-
tonomy, competence and relatedness need satisfaction
on short-term adoption, a binary logistic regression test
was conducted. It is important to note that the inten-
tion level is a strong predictor of adoption behavior [48].
Therefore, it was added as a control variable. As Table 3
shows, only relatedness and autonomy significantly in-
fluenced the adoption rate. Although the competence
variable increased adoption, this effect is not significant.
Moreover, the interactions between the three variables
do not have a significant effect on adoption. To test the
null hypothesis, that there is no difference between the
eight groups with respect to password manager adoption
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rate, χ2 tests were used. The null hypothesis (Hb0) can
be rejected.
Table 3. Binary Logistic Regression (A=Autonomy,
C=Competence, R=Relatedness) Significance Starred
Variables β Std. Err. p
Intention .915 .110 .000*
A 1.099 .511 .031*
C .285 .562 .613
R 1.046 .514 .042*
A*C -.218 .723 .763
A*R -.956 .685 .163
C*R -.216 .732 .768
A*C*R .423 .965 .661
Table 4. Hypothesis Summary (A*=Accepted* ,
R=Rejected)
Ha0 Ha1
R A*
Hb0 Hb1 Hb2 Hb3 Hb4 Hb5 Hb6 Hb7
R A* R A* R R R R
Reasons for Adoption Decision: To understand
why our participants chose, or did not choose, to install
a password manager, we presented a post-questionnaire
that popped up a week after they installed the app. We
asked: “Have you installed a password manager?”, with
predefined multiple choice answers.
Of the 470 participants, 70% reported not installing a
password manager while 30% did install one. Of those
who installed, 81%(113) used it and 19%(26) had in-
stalled but not yet used it. The three top reasons for
installing were that they could not remember their pass-
words (90%), to store their data securely (53%), and
to keep passwords synchronized across devices (37%).
Top reasons for NOT installing included the fact that it
took too much time to set up (30%), trust issues (30%)
and external factors such as a lack of storage space (8%).
6. Discussion
This study empirically tested the impact of an interven-
tion that satisfied participants’ SDT needs, and then ob-
served their actions in terms of installing a password
manager. We experimentally manipulated autonomy,
competence, and relatedness need satisfaction within the
context of recommending a password manager to deter-
mine which of the individual needs, or which combina-
tion thereof, exerted the most powerful influence.
This intervention enabled an effective test of SDT’s
assumption that SDT’s autonomy, competence and relat-
edness need satisfaction yield positive behavioral out-
comes. Based on SDT’s predictions, we would expect
all three to impact on adoption. Our study showed that
autonomy and relatedness need satisfaction did indeed
have a significant impact on adoption decisions.
Furthermore, although SDT only predicts the addi-
tive relations between the factors and the performance
of the target behavior, we were interested in exploring
the effect of two- and three-way interactions between the
factors. We did not detect significant interaction effects.
Recommendations: This study offers useful in-
sights into the potential of applying SDT and recom-
mender systems to support the search for a suitable pass-
word manager. As already mentioned, the study pro-
vided evidence of the positive impact of supporting au-
tonomy and relatedness needs. Doing this makes it more
likely that Android Smartphone users will adopt a pass-
word manager.
Adoption Intervention: When giving security ad-
vice to end users, it is important to make it possible for
them to consider the adoption decision from a personal
perspective. A previous study [8] found that after a user
becomes aware of password managers, and planned to
use one, they would commence the process by searching
for a suitable one. If they decided to proceed, a selection
would be made from the proffered options. Supporting
the user’s search and decide decisions, by providing a
recommender system, facilitates behavioral adaptations
i.e. trials.
This mechanism might be applied to improve adop-
tion of other security tools by providing appropriate in-
terventions to facilitate the adoption process.
Furthermore, the nexus between SDT and the aware-
ness intervention provided by the recommender app is
an important contribution.
Relatedness: Some password manager providers al-
ready use word-of-mouth referrals by encouraging their
users to invite other potential users. Our study provides
evidence of the effectiveness of such referral systems in
encouraging adoption. Our way of supporting related-
ness does not undermine the users’ autonomy need by
mandating one particular password manager. Instead, it
engaged the users in the decision-making process and
makes suggestions in line with the user’s own prefer-
ences.
Autonomy: Employing non-controlling language
and providing choices to support autonomy successfully
encouraged more users to adopt a password manager.
Using bossy language when advising the users to im-
prove their security might violate autonomy. For exam-
ple, instructing users with: “you have to change your
password!” might lead to a reactance response. As al-
ready noted, providing choice concerning a difficult de-
cision, such as choosing a password manager applica-
tion, supports the autonomy need. This might explain
why Fagan et al. [69] found, in their study, that par-
ticipants preferred the software update/warning message
design that gave them different update options.
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Competence: Unexpectedly, the effect of Compe-
tence was not significant. However, we cannot conclude
from our study that the satisfaction of competence will
always be insignificant. Two explanations suggest them-
selves for our results. The first is that the way we sat-
isfied competence might have been suboptimal and did
not genuinely meet the person’s competence needs. The
second is that this particular group happened to contain
more low intention participants than others, purely by
chance.
Furthermore, competence might be less effective
with critical systems. Bonini [70] found that the manip-
ulation of competence did not have a significant effect
on air traffic controllers’ decisions to trust other con-
trollers or their technology.
Another possible explanation is the fact that compe-
tence takes time to acquire [71]. Our study was a short-
term experiment and, given the criticality of the data, it
might be that more time is needed to develop compe-
tence. Finally, electronic recommendations might cre-
ate more uncertainty than face-to-face interaction with
an expert [72], by exacerbating feelings of uncertainty.
Reasons for the adoption decision: Although the
main function of a password manager is to provide a so-
lution to password security and memorability issues, the
analysis of the post questionnaire revealed that a major-
ity of users adopted password managers to support their
memory. The study also found that one of the barri-
ers for not installing a password manger is the time it
takes to set it up. Developers need to minimize pass-
word manager setup times. Moreover, the popularity
of password managers among small groups of users can
convince more users to adopt these tools.
Summary: Security system designers should con-
sider supporting autonomy, relatedness and competence
needs when designing their system interfaces. More-
over, we should pay attention to supporting the recom-
mended security behavior from the user’s perspective.
Study Limitations: First, given that the study was
conducted in the wild, we were not able to ensure that
participants paid attention to the language used by the
recommender application. Second, we did not conduct
manipulation checks to ensure that the variations in the
design had their intended effects [73]. We included a
FAQ feature to satisfy the competence need, but we do
not know that it actually did so. Nevertheless, according
to O’Keefe [74], when message variations are identified
in terms of intrinsic features, manipulation checks are
unnecessary. Third, since the study encouraged partic-
ipants to recruit other participants in order to support
the relatedness need, this might have led to a sampling
bias. Fourth, in-the-wild studies make it impossible to
control all external variables. It is possible that factors
such as limited storage or time pressure, for example,
prevented adoption. Finally, we verified whether or not
the participants had installed a password manager. This
does not mean that they necessarily retained it. A study
to monitor usage longitudinally would deliver more re-
liable insights into long-term adoption.
7. Conclusions & Future Work
Very few people use these password managers, and we
wanted to determine whether we could encourage adop-
tion by meeting people’s self determination needs. We
ran a longitudinal experiment, offering people a recom-
mender application that met their needs, and monitored
their device to see whether they subsequently installed
a password manager. We discovered that satisfying the
three needs, particularly autonomy and relatedness, did
indeed encourage adoption.
The next step is to explore the factors affecting the
long-term adoption. However, we first need to focus
more closely on meeting competence needs,to find ways
of satisfying this need more effectively.
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